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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS IN INDIANA: 
MANDATORY REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE AND THE 
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
Alberto Bernabe* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is often said that the duty of confidentiality is the most important of 
all the fiduciary duties attorneys owe their clients.1  This is so because 
without confidentiality, clients would presumably not feel free to seek legal 
representation, or at least, would not feel free to speak openly with their 
lawyers.2  This notion is clearly the basis for the recognition of the duty, 
which the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional 
 
 © 2016 Alberto Bernabe.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and 
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so 
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review 
Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
 *  Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.  Professor Bernabe’s 
Professional Responsibility blog is available at http://bernabepr.blogspot.com. 
 1  See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS 129 (5th ed. 2016) (noting that the “[t]rust between lawyer and client is . . . the 
‘cornerstone of . . . effective assistance of counsel,’ and fidelity to that trust is ‘the glory of 
[the legal] profession’” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 
(6th Cir. 1981); and then quoting United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24, 24 (C.C.D. Colo. 
1889)); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.1 (1986) (“[B]oth sacred and 
controversial, the principle of confidentiality of client information is well-embedded in the 
traditional notion of the Anglo-American client-lawyer relationship.”). 
 2  As explained by the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 
(1976), “if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from 
the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client 
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed 
legal advice.”  See also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 138 (stating that 
“confidentiality is essential to candid disclosure of embarrassing and potentially harmful 
truths from clients to their lawyers”); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 45–46 (2009).   
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Conduct3—the model for the rules in almost all American jurisdictions4—
explain as follows: 
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the 
absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal 
information relating to the representation. . . . This contributes to the 
trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.  The client is 
thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully 
and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally 
damaging subject matter.  The lawyer needs this information to 
represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to 
refrain from wrongful conduct.  Almost without exception, clients come 
to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex 
of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct.  Based upon 
experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice 
given, and the law is upheld.5 
Yet, confidentiality can be a double-edged sword.6  Protecting the 
secrecy of certain information can be dangerous.  For example, it may 
create risks to others,7 prevent the conviction of guilty defendants, result in 
 
 3  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2015).  
 4  The rules of forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands are 
based on the ABA Model Rules.  State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_o
f_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Sept. 7, 
2016).  Only California and Puerto Rico have not adopted the Model Rules.  See id.  For a 
complete list of the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Rules, see id.  
 5  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 6  FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 130 (“No rule of law, no matter how 
fundamental and explicit, has ever been unwavering or free of ambiguities, and the 
protection of lawyer-client confidentiality is no exception.”) 
 7  GILLERS, supra note 2, at 46–47.  There is a recurring debate over whether courts 
should allow settlement agreements that prevent the disclosure of information that could 
affect public safety.  See DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 75–76 (2d ed. 2007) (asserting that “[m]any unsafe or 
unlawful practices would come to light sooner if there were more legislative or ethical 
prohibitions on . . . secrecy clauses”).  For example, the issue was much discussed in the 
media, including an episode of the television program 60 Minutes, in the wake of the news 
that Firestone Tire Company had settled lawsuits involving defective tires preventing the 
disclosure of the defects, which later caused injuries to others.  See, e.g., Frances 
Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret?, 35 TRIAL 55, 56 n.7 (1999) (citing 
Williamson v. Superior Court, 582 P.2d 126 (Cal. 1978)); Richard Zitrin, The Fault Lies in 
the Ethics Rules, 23 NAT’L L.J., July 9, 2001, at A-25; see also RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL 
M. LANGFORD, Keeping it Secret (Or, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You), in THE MORAL 
COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 183–208 (1999) (discussing secret settlement 
agreements in the context of products liability). 
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the conviction of innocent defendants,8 and prevent the disclosure of 
information that could provide comfort or closure to victims.9  
Understanding this, the drafters of the ABA Model Rules also crafted many 
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.  In fact, many lawyers are 
surprised to learn that, when added up, there are more than a dozen 
recognized exceptions throughout the ABA Model Rules.10  In addition, 
 
 8  The case involving Mr. Alton Logan, who in 1982 was wrongfully convicted for a 
murder he did not commit, illustrates this point.  Harold J. Winston, Learning From Alton 
Logan, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 173, 173 (2009).  In this case, the actual killer, Andrew 
Wilson, confessed to his two attorneys but did not consent to disclosure of his confession in 
order to exonerate Logan.  Id.  However, the attorneys convinced Wilson to consent to 
disclosure after his death.  Id.  Unfortunately for Logan, Wilson lived for another twenty-six 
years, during which Logan remained in prison, even though Wilson’s lawyers knew he was 
innocent.  See id.  Logan was released from prison in 2008.  Id.  Logan’s case and the issues 
it raises are discussed in Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should Be a 
Wrongful Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 391, 391 (2008) (citing 60 Minutes: 26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man in Prison 
(CBS television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/06/60minutes/main3914719.shtml (last updated 
May 23, 2008)); Gary Rowe, Potential Expansion, or Modification, to the Permissive 
Exceptions of Model Rule 1.6: Client-Lawyer Confidentiality in Criminal Law and “The 
Gap,” 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 291, 291–92 (2015); Ken Strutin, Preserving Attorney-Client 
Confidentiality at the Cost of Another’s Innocence: A Systemic Approach, 17 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 499, 511–14 (2011); Adam Belsey, Note, When Innocence is 
Confidential: A New and Essential Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 56 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 147, 149–53 (2016).  
 9  The famous “buried bodies case” of the 1970s is still the best example of this 
concern.  The case involved two lawyers who knew the location of their client’s victims but 
did not disclose the information until much later.  See People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 
799–800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).  One of the 
lawyers, Francis Belge, was charged with a violation of a public health statute, but the court 
dismissed the charges in an opinion that emphasized the importance of the concept of 
confidentiality.  Id. at 803.  Belge was quoted stating, “[K]nowing how the parents must 
feel, [we] wanted to advise them where the bodies were . . . . But since it was a privileged 
communication, we could not reveal any information that was given to us in confidence.”  





set&pgtype=article&contentCollection=Archives, reprinted in RICHARD A. ZITRIN ET AL., 
LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 119–20 (4th ed. 2013).  The story behind this case 
has been told in numerous publications, including a book written by the other lawyer 
involved in the case, Frank Armani.  See TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK ARMANI, PRIVILEGED 
INFORMATION (1984); see also RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL LANGFORD, Buried Bodies: Robert 
Garrow and His Lawyers, in THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 7–26 (1999). 
 10  Most of the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality are in Rule 1.6 of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, but there are additional exceptions recognized in Rules 1.13 
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special statutes that impose an opposite duty—a duty to disclose 
information under certain circumstances—can affect the duty of 
confidentiality.  Most common among this type of statute are state statutes 
that mandate disclosure of information related to child abuse.  All 
American jurisdictions have enacted such statutes, but they vary greatly in 
the details.11 
As one might expect, therefore, there may be circumstances in which a 
lawyer may find a conflict between the duty to keep information secret and 
the duty to disclose it.  Assume, for example, that a lawyer learns through 
the representation of a client that the client, or someone else for that matter, 
has engaged or is engaging in sexual abuse of a minor.  Assuming the 
information is confidential as defined by the applicable rules of 
professional conduct, does the lawyer have a duty to keep the information 
secret, or a duty to disclose it under the state’s disclosure statute?  The 
answer may vary from state to state and will likely depend on the specific 
language of the reporting statute and the rules of professional conduct in 
the particular jurisdiction.  Yet, unfortunately, due to recent State Bar 
activity, the answer in Indiana is now even more confusing. 
In 2015, the Legal Ethics Committee of the Indiana State Bar 
Association issued an Opinion (the “Opinion”) addressing a lawyer’s duty 
to conceal or disclose information regarding sexual abuse of a minor.  It 
concluded that, under Indiana law, absent client consent, an attorney may 
not report information about suspected child abuse learned during the 
representation of the client unless the lawyer believes disclosing the 
information is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
bodily harm.12  In reaching this conclusion, however, the Committee 
disregarded the text of the applicable Rule of Professional Conduct and did 
not consider the possible scenarios that could result from its interpretation 
of Indiana’s mandatory disclosure statute, the doctrine of the attorney-
client privilege, and the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In the end, the recent Committee Opinion creates confusion and 
defeats the purpose of providing guidance to lawyers about their ethical 
obligations.  In an effort to clarify this confusion, this Essay will explain 
the issue presented by the Opinion and will suggest the analysis needed for 
 
and 3.3.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2, 1.13, 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2015). 
 11  All fifty states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have enacted statutes mandating 
disclosure of child abuse.  CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT 1 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [hereinafter 
MANDATORY REPORTERS]. 
 12  See Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Opinion No. 2 of 2015, 59 RES 
GESTAE 24, 24 (2015). 
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its proper resolution according to the Indiana Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Part I of this Essay will briefly discuss the issue of child abuse in 
the United States, which has led many states to restructure or rethink their 
reporting obligations and confidentiality laws.  Next, Part II will outline the 
Indiana Ethics Committee’s Opinion, highlighting the flaws in the 
Committee’s reasoning in light of the plain text of Indiana’s mandatory 
reporting statute and Rules of Professional Conduct.  Part III will then 
analyze the Opinion in light of the interplay between this mandatory 
reporting statute and the duty of confidentiality, as laid out in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  In so doing, it will show that the conclusion reached 
by the Ethics Committee in its recent Opinion is unsubstantiated by the 
law.  The Essay will conclude by providing a four-step analysis that 
attorneys should follow to determine whether the duty of confidentiality 
applies in a given situation. 
I.     CHILD ABUSE AND REPORTING DUTIES 
Over the years, there have been enough recurring reports of child 
abuse throughout the United States—whether involving clergymen, 
educational institutions, or just individuals—to support the statement that 
child abuse is a major societal problem.13  Back in the 1980s, it was 
reported that state child protective agencies received more than one million 
complaints of child abuse and neglect that resulted in demonstrable harm 
every year.14  A report in 2004 estimated that almost ten percent of students 
“in public schools experience some form of educator sexual misconduct, 
ranging from offensive comments to rape.”15  More recently, an article 
published in May 2016 by the same team of Boston Globe journalists that 
produced the story behind the movie Spotlight16 highlighted an 
 
 13  See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Thank You, Penn State, VERDICT (May 12, 2016), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/05/12/thank-penn-state (asserting that when the Sandusky 
scandal broke, it proved to the world that the issue of institution-based child sex abuse is a 
society-wide problem, not one isolated to particular institutions). 
 14  Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client 
Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 203–
04 (1992) (citing NAT’L CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., CD-11794, STUDY FINDINGS: STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND 
PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: 1988, at 7-1 (1988)). 
 15  Katharine Q. Seelye, Prep Schools Wrestle with Sex Abuse Accusations Against 
Teachers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/us/prep-
schools-wrestle-with-sex-abuse-accusations-against-
teachers.html?emc=edit_th_20160418&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=69110943&_r=2.  
 16  Spotlight is a 2015 film that depicts a Boston Globe team of journalists’ 
investigation into cases of widespread and systemic child sex abuse in the Boston area by 
numerous Catholic priests.  SPOTLIGHT (Open Road Films 2015).  For more information 
about the story and the film, see the articles collected in The Story Behind the ‘Spotlight’ 
Movie, BOS. GLOBE, http://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/movies/spotlight-movie#spotlight 
2016] T H R O U G H  T H E  L O O K I N G  G L A S S  I N  I N D I A N A  27 
investigation that revealed more than 200 victims, and at least ninety legal 
claims involving at least sixty-seven schools in New England.17  Yet, the 
problem is difficult to confront, in part, because of the helplessness of the 
victims who most often do not report the offending conduct. 
In an attempt to improve the detection of abuse, all states and U.S. 
territories have enacted some version of mandatory child abuse reporting 
laws.18  Yet, the details vary greatly among them, some applying only to 
specific categories of people,19 others being more general, and some 
recognizing exceptions to protect confidentiality duties or legal rights.20 
Legal professionals are not often mentioned among those who are 
mandated reporters of child abuse.21  In addition, the mandatory reporting 
statutes in most jurisdictions do not abrogate the attorney-client privilege.22  
Although some have argued that preserving the applicability of the 
privilege does not technically dispense of the duty to report,23 it is 
 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2016); Meredith Goldstein, How the ‘Spotlight’ Movie Got Made, BOS. 
GLOBE (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/names/2015/10/30/how-
spotlight-movie-got-made/wXVXUiYPkoF3hEP9K4dydP/story.html.  
 17  Jenn Abelson et al., Private Schools, Painful Secrets, BOS. GLOBE (May 8, 2016), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/05/06/private-schools-painful-
secrets/OaRI9PFpRnCTJxCzko5hkN/story.html (reporting on more than 200 victims and at 
least ninety legal claims involving at least sixty-seven private schools in New England). 
 18  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 19  “[F]orty-eight states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands designate professions whose 
members are mandated by law to report child maltreatment.”  MANDATORY REPORTERS, 
supra note 11, at 2.  The most common professions listed are social workers, teachers, 
school administrators, physicians, nurses, counselors, therapists, childcare providers, and 
law enforcement officers.  Id. 
 20  See id. at 3–4.   
 21  See id. at 2.  However, there is uncertainty regarding the classification of lawyers 
who work as professors in law school, and, in particular, those who supervise student legal 
clinics.  
 22  See id. at 3; see also Mosteller, supra note 14, at 223–24. 
 23  See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 224–35.  The attorney-client privilege gives a 
client the right to prevent his or her lawyer from disclosing certain information in a 
proceeding in which the rules of evidence apply.  See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 6.3.4, at 
253; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 86 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (privilege can be invoked “[w]hen an attempt is made to introduce evidence or 
obtain discovery” of a privileged communication).  Reporting to a child welfare agency is 
not disclosing information within a proceeding where the rules of evidence apply.  
Presumably, therefore, a lawyer could be obligated to report the information, and still be 
able to raise the privilege in an evidentiary proceeding in order to prevent the admission of 
evidence regarding the communication.  In other words, the state could force the lawyer to 
provide the information in order for the state to investigate, but could not force the lawyer to 
testify about it in a judicial proceeding.  Thus, according to this interpretation, the obligation 
to report would not eliminate the availability of the privilege.  Also, the privilege only 
covers information provided in confidence by the client to the attorney for the purpose of 
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commonly thought that preserving the privilege means that lawyers are not 
required to report information that would otherwise be protected by the 
privilege.24 
In contrast, Indiana is one of just a few states25 that have enacted a 
mandatory child abuse disclosure statute that imposes a duty to disclose on 
everyone;26 and “everyone” presumably includes practicing lawyers.27  On 
the other hand, subject to some exceptions, Rule 1.6 of Indiana’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct (the “Rule”) imposes a duty of confidentiality that 
covers all information related to the legal representation.28  Thus, it is not 
surprising that the conflict that could potentially result from these two 
general principles prompted the Ethics Committee to address this matter in 
an Opinion. 
 
obtaining legal representation.  See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 6.3.2, at 251 (“The attorney-
client privilege is not a rule protecting privacy per se, but only privacy in the context and for 
the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to a legal adviser by one seeking legal services.”).  
If the attorney obtains the information about the child abuse from a third party, or from the 
client but in the presence of a third party, the information is confidential but not covered by 
the privilege.  See id. § 6.3.6, at 262 (“Communications from a nonclient . . . are outside the 
attorney-client privilege.”); id. § 6.3.7, at 264 (explaining that the attorney-client privilege 
does not extend to statements made in the presence and hearing of a third party because such 
communications involve “an aura of nonconfidentiality”).  In such a case, the attorney 
would have to disclose the information even if the statute stated that attorneys do not have a 
duty to report privileged information.  See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 240.  However, the 
obligation to report can defeat the policy behind the privilege in that it would affect the 
client’s trust and openness to discuss unfavorable information with the attorney.  See id. at 
230–31 (“Even if the state is ultimately prohibited from calling the lawyer as a witness at 
the client’s trial, the major damage would have been done, and the promise of secrecy . . . 
would prove ineffective in facilitating open and free confiding of sensitive information. . . . 
[and] if statements made by a client are known to be subject to mandatory disclosure . . . the 
privilege is wholly destroyed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 24  See MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 11, at 2. 
 25  Eighteen states and Puerto Rico require any person who suspects child abuse or 
neglect to report.  Id. at 2. 
 26  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 2016); see also id. § 31-33-22-1(a) (stating that 
a failure to report is a misdemeanor); MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 11, at 22; Ind. 
State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 12. 
 27  See Donald R. Lundberg, Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting by Lawyers, 55 RES 
GESTAE 31, 31 (2011) (noting that the mandatory reporting statute says all individuals who 
have reason to believe that a child is a victim of sexual abuse have a duty to report and 
“lawyers are ‘individuals’ for mandatory child abuse reporting purposes”).  
 28  See IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2016), 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/prof_conduct/#_Toc418253513. 
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II.      INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 
2 OF 2015 
The Opinion began by stating the specific question it sought to 
address: “If a lawyer learns, while representing a client, that a child is a 
victim of abuse or neglect, must the lawyer make a report to the Indiana 
Department of Child Services or local law enforcement?”29  As the Opinion 
explained, the mandatory reporting statute in Indiana (the “Statute”) is 
broadly phrased, stating that any “individual who has reason to believe that 
a child is a victim of child abuse or neglect” is obligated to immediately 
make a report to the Department of Child Services or to the local law 
enforcement agency.30  Making no explicit exceptions for lawyers, the 
Statute appears to require lawyers to disclose confidential information, 
which led the drafters of the Opinion to conclude that there is “a conflict 
between the lawyer’s ethical duty to keep silent and the apparent duty to 
speak.”31  Yet, as discussed below, a careful reading of the Indiana Rules of 
Professional Conduct shows this supposed “conflict” does not really exist. 
Having concluded that the Statute and Rules of Professional Conduct 
present a conflict for lawyers, the Committee proceeded to seek a solution 
to the conflict, concluding that lawyers must not comply with the Statute 
unless complying is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm.32  Although based on good intentions, the analysis 
underlying this conclusion is flawed. 
The Committee began this analysis with the broad assertion that 
because the Indiana Constitution recognizes that the Indiana Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction over attorney discipline and the authority to regulate 
the legal profession, recognizing that the Statute imposes a duty on lawyers 
would violate the principle of separation of powers.33  According to this 
argument, a statute that imposes a duty on lawyers would be 
unconstitutional because the Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from 
interfering with the Judiciary’s authority to regulate the legal profession. 
There are a number of flaws in this argument.  First, although it is true 
that the Indiana Supreme Court has the authority to regulate the legal 
profession, that authority is not necessarily exclusive.  There are many 
statutes that regulate the profession both directly and indirectly,34 as do 
doctrines related to malpractice and contract law.35  The fact of the matter 
 
 29  Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 12, at 24. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. at 25. 
 32  See id. 
 33  See id.  
 34  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-43-1-1 (West 2016) (prohibiting practice of law by 
non-attorneys). 
 35  See, e.g., id. § 33-43-1-3 (describing the duties of an attorney). 
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is that the legal profession is highly regulated by a combination of sources 
of authority including court decisions, legislation, and administrative 
regulations.  As explained by noted legal ethics author and professor 
Stephen Gillers, “many of the rules governing the behavior of lawyers do in 
fact come to us not from a code of ethics but from court decisions (in the 
areas of malpractice, fiduciary duty, tort, and agency law among others), 
legislation, and agency rules.”36  If the Committee’s argument were correct, 
as long as the Rules of Conduct were adopted under the authority of the 
Indiana Supreme Court, the Legislature could never adopt legislation or 
rules to regulate any aspect of the legal profession. 
In support of the second part of its conclusion, the Committee simply 
repeated the policy reasons behind the duty of confidentiality.  The 
Committee reiterated that “requiring lawyers to protect their client’s 
confidences likewise protects the attorney-client relationship,”37 that if 
forced to disclose confidential informa tion clients will likely withhold 
information,38 and that a betrayal of a client’s trust could result in 
“irreversible harm to the client’s relationship to any attorney.”39 
Based on this general policy behind the duty of confidentiality, the 
Committee then attempted to reach a compromise.  As explained in the 
Opinion, the compromise position is that lawyers have a duty to disclose in 
certain cases and a duty not to disclose in all others.  The Committee 
explained its conclusion as follows: 
[T]he Committee believes a lawyer must report that a child is a victim 
of abuse or neglect “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
bodily harm.” 
Initially, the constitutional conflict mentioned above is no longer 
present, as the Supreme Court, through the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, specifically authorizes lawyers to disclose client information 
in such situations.  More significantly, while the prudential concerns 
(harm to the attorney-client relationship chief among them) remain, 
Rule 1.6 “recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity 
and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably 
certain death or substantial bodily harm.”  The reasons for “exempting” 
attorneys from the general reporting rule being, in such situations, either 
nullified or substantially negated, the general reporting requirement 
applies, and lawyers must report.40 
Interestingly, the first part of the Committee’s conclusion—that 
lawyers must disclose confidential information to the extent the lawyer 
 
 36  GILLERS, supra note 2, at 3 (“So-called codes of ethics . . . are just one part . . . of 
the regulatory architecture for lawyers.”). 
 37  Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 12, at 25. 
 38  Id. at 27. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted). 
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believes reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm—is correct, but not for the reasons suggested in the 
Opinion.  The Committee based this conclusion on the argument that the 
duty of confidentiality essentially supersedes the Statute, and since the 
Rules of Professional Conduct recognize “the overriding value of life and 
physical integrity,” the duty of confidentiality must require disclosure 
under circumstances where disclosure could prevent death or substantial 
harm.41 
The Committee’s argument misinterprets what the Rule says and 
substitutes its text with what the Committee would like it to say.  Even 
though part of the policy behind the exception to the duty of confidentiality 
is the recognition of the value of life and physical integrity, the Rule does 
not impose a duty to disclose.  Even in cases of possible death or 
substantial bodily harm, whether to disclose is always left to the discretion 
of each attorney.42  The Rule states that “[a] lawyer may reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary” to “prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
bodily harm,”43 and, as the Rules themselves also explain, rules that use 
“the term ‘may,’ are permissive and define areas . . . in which the lawyer 
has discretion to exercise professional judgment.”44  Most importantly, the 
Rules also state that as to rules that use the term “may,” “[n]o disciplinary 
action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within 
the bounds of such discretion.”45  Thus, it is wrong to assume, as the 
Committee appears to have done, that the Rules of Professional Conduct 
impose a duty to disclose in order to prevent death or substantially bodily 
harm.  Maybe that is what the Rule should say; maybe it is what the 
Committee would prefer it to say.  But it is not what the Rule does say.46 
 
 41  Id. (quoting IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 6) 
 42  See IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b).  
 43  Id. (emphasis added). 
 44  Id. at scope 14. 
 45  Id. 
 46  A better argument in support of the Committee’s conclusion can be found in 
Section 63 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which suggests that, 
even though a lawyer’s duty not to disclose confidential information is superseded when the 
law specifically requires disclosure, a lawyer has a duty to resist the disclosure of 
confidential information if there is a non-frivolous argument that the law does not require 
the lawyer to disclose.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 63 
cmts. a–b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  The problem with this argument, however, is that the 
Restatement concedes that the duty of confidentiality would be superseded by a mandatory 
reporting statute that applies to lawyers and that in such a case, the argument against the 
duty to disclose under the statute, although not frivolous, would be significantly weakened. 
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III.     INTERPLAY BETWEEN INDIANA’S DISCLOSURE STATUTE AND RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Ironically, the Committee’s conclusion is actually correct for the 
opposite reason it seems to embrace.  Given the interplay between the 
mandatory disclosure statute and the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
lawyers must disclose information regarding child abuse because the 
Statute says they must,47 not because the Rules do so.48  In other words, the 
Statute imposes a duty to disclose, whereas the Rules allow lawyers to 
comply with that duty.  Since the duty to disclose imposed by the Statute is 
mandatory, the net effect is that, unless they want to face criminal 
charges,49 lawyers are obligated to disclose. 
For the same reason, however, the Committee’s other conclusion—
that attorneys are barred from disclosing confidential information in all 
other cases—is wrong.  This is so because Rule 1.6(b)(6) of the Indiana 
Rules of Professional Conduct recognizes that a lawyer may disclose 
confidential information to comply with other laws.50  In other words, 
according to the clear text of the Rule itself, under circumstances that do 
not involve possible death or substantial harm, a lawyer can comply with 
the mandatory disclosure statute without violating the duty of 
confidentiality. 
In the end, the language in both exceptions to the duty of 
confidentiality recognized in the Rules shows that the Committee erred in 
concluding that there is a conflict between the Statute and the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  In fact, there is no such conflict at all.  The Statute 
says a lawyer must disclose, and the Rules say the lawyer can do so.51  
Disclosing under those circumstances (either because there is risk of death 
or substantial harm, or simply because the statute requires it) does not 
 
 47  See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 2016) (“[A]n individual who has reason to 
believe that a child is a victim of child abuse or neglect shall make a report as required by 
this article.”).  
 48  For a discussion of the relationship between state reporting statutes and the rules of 
professional conduct, see Mosteller, supra note 14, at 238 (stating that the command that a 
lawyer keep information confidential as part of her professional responsibility cannot 
supersede an otherwise mandatory legal duty to report, so the lawyer is obligated to report 
abuse if learned from sources outside the attorney-client privilege). 
 49  See IND. CODE § 31-32-22-1 (stating that failure to report on child abuse as required 
by the statute is a Class B misdemeanor).  
 50  IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (“A lawyer may reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary . . . to comply with other law or a court order.”).  
 51  RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A 
STUDENT’S GUIDE § 1.6-12, at 290 (2012–2013) (“If disclosure is permitted or required 
under state law, such as a child abuse reporting statute, one would think that the state policy 
promoting disclosure would override a general confidentiality rule.  But, given the exception 
under Rule 1.6(b)(6), such analysis is not needed.”). 
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constitute a violation of the ethical duty to keep the information 
confidential.52  Thus, by concluding that, other than in cases of reasonably 
certain death or substantial bodily harm, a lawyer cannot report the relevant 
information when the Rules say the lawyer can report, the Committee’s 
interpretation of the Rule is now in conflict with its actual text. 
Given that the Indiana mandatory disclosure statute does not state 
whether attorneys are exempted from the duty to disclose, nor whether it 
abrogates the attorney-client privilege, there are three possible 
interpretations of the interplay between the Statute, the attorney-client 
privilege, and the duty of confidentiality in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  However, as shown below, the Committee’s Opinion, reaches a 
conclusion that is not compatible with any of the possible interpretations. 
The first way to interpret the state of the law is that the Statute applies 
to lawyers but does not abrogate the attorney-client privilege.  In such a 
case, there are two possible results.  In the first instance, lawyers would be 
mandated to report abuse of children, but such information would not be 
admissible in evidence in proceedings during which the client could raise 
the privilege.  In the second one, lawyers would not be mandated to report 
because the recognition of the attorney-client privilege would be 
interpreted to mean that there is no duty to disclose under the Statute. 
In the first of these two scenarios, once it is accepted that lawyers 
have a duty to disclose under the Statute, it follows that they would be 
allowed to do so without violating the ethical duty of confidentiality, 
because Rule 1.6 recognizes an exception to comply with statutes, 
regardless of whether there is a risk of death or substantial harm.  The 
Committee’s conclusion is incompatible with this because it limits the duty 
to disclose to cases of a risk of death or substantial harm, instead of 
recognizing that the duty to disclose would apply in all cases. 
In the second scenario, lawyers would not be required to disclose 
under the Statute but would be allowed to do so at their discretion under the 
exception that states that lawyers may disclose to the extent they deem 
reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
harm.  The Committee’s conclusion is incompatible with this analysis 
because it states that attorneys have a mandatory duty to disclose under 
such circumstances.  That conclusion is not supported by the text of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Finally, the third possibility is to hold that the Statute applies to 
lawyers and that the privilege is abrogated.  Obviously, this would mean 
 
 52  See Megan M. Smith, Note, Causing Conflict: Indiana’s Mandatory Reporting 
Laws in the Context of Juvenile Defense, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 439, 451–52 (2014) (“[I]t 
appears that an attorney would be excepted from keeping confidential information 
pertaining to the abuse of a child because child abuse is a crime that could result in death or 
substantial bodily harm, and the mandatory reporting laws requiring any individual to report 
meet the exception for complying with another law.”). 
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attorneys have a duty to disclose under the Statute and that the Rules of 
Professional Conduct would allow them to do so regardless of whether 
there is a risk of death or bodily harm under the exception that allows 
attorneys to disclose confidential information to comply with “other laws.”  
Since the Rules allow attorneys to comply with the other law, and the other 
law imposes a mandatory duty to disclose, under this interpretation, 
attorneys would have a mandatory duty to disclose in all cases.  Again, 
since the Committee concluded there is only a duty to disclose in some 
cases, its conclusion is inconsistent with the proper analysis of the doctrine. 
IV.     POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMMITTEE’S OPINION 
Because it reinterprets the Statute and the Rules of Professional 
Conduct to say something they do not say, the Committee’s Opinion may 
produce a number of regrettable consequences.  First and foremost, the 
Opinion generates confusion as to what the duty of a lawyer is.  As stated 
above, the Opinion set out to answer a specific question: “If a lawyer 
learns, while representing a client, that a child is a victim of abuse or 
neglect, must the lawyer make a report to the Indiana Department of Child 
Services or local law enforcement?”53  The Committee says the lawyer has 
a duty to keep the information confidential except in cases where disclosure 
is reasonably necessary to prevent death or substantial bodily injury.  Yet, 
the Rules say the lawyer can disclose to satisfy the mandatory disclosure 
statute. 
As a result, in a case in which disclosure is not necessary to prevent 
death or substantially bodily injury, if a lawyer follows the Committee’s 
conclusion and does not disclose, the lawyer may be found to be in 
violation of the Statute and charged with a misdemeanor.  The Committee’s 
Opinion, which does not have the force of law,54 would not be a bar to such 
prosecution.55  If, on the other hand, the lawyer discloses to comply with 
the Statute, the lawyer may be found to have acted in violation of an ethical 
duty and be subject to discipline—including disbarment—if the state 
disciplinary authorities agree with the Committee’s interpretation.  Finally, 
lawyers who disclose information because they disagree with the 
Committee’s interpretation that there is a duty not to disclose under the 
Statute may open themselves to civil claims for negligence or breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
 
 53  Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 12, at 24. 
 54  The opinion itself starts by reminding readers that it is only advisory in nature and 
does not have the force of law.  See id. 
 55  David L. Hudson, Jr., Conflicted Over Confidentiality: Indiana Ethics Opinion 
Says Lawyers Not Always Obligated to Report Child Abuse, 35 CHILD L. PRAC. 42, 43 
(2016) (Hudson quotes Professor Peter A. Joy of the Washington University School of Law 
in St. Louis, stating, “The ethics opinion does not and could not bar such a prosecution, and 
the opinion even states at the start that it ‘does not have the force of law.’”). 
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One would think that lawyers would abide by the Statute and then 
argue, if necessary, that the Rules of Professional Conduct allow the 
disclosure.  But, because of the Committee’s Opinion, lawyers may fear 
they will be subject to sanctions or civil lawsuits if they disclose the 
information.  Thus, oddly, the Opinion needlessly puts at risk the safety of 
both children and attorneys at the same time.56 
CONCLUSION 
When Alice, the main character in Lewis Carroll’s Through the 
Looking-Glass, walks through a mirror into an alternative reality, she finds 
herself in a world where things and words, appear, to her, to be reversed.57  
Something like that seems to have happened in Indiana, where the Ethics 
Committee of the State Bar Association announced that a permissible duty 
under the Rules of Professional Conduct was a mandatory duty, and that, at 
the same time, conduct that used to be permissible would no longer be 
allowed.  In this alternative reality created by the Committee, lawyers have 
a duty to disobey a mandatory statute—thus, a duty to commit a 
misdemeanor—and a duty to keep secret information the Rules allow them 
to disclose. 
Hopefully, something can be done to walk back from the other side of 
the mirror.  Once back, the Committee should withdraw the Opinion and 
reconsider strategies to achieve a more satisfactory result than the one 
promoted by the current state of the law.58  Evidently, Indiana has taken the 
view that maximizing the efforts to help victims of child abuse is more 
important than protecting the policy behind the need for confidentiality 
within the attorney-client relationship.  However, although excepting 
lawyers from the statutory duty to disclose will eliminate one possible 
source of information needed to provide help for abused children, it could 
also be argued that preserving the confidentiality of the information 
disclosed within the attorney-client relationship is the better policy.59  The 
 
 56  See id. (quoting Professor Joy saying, “In my opinion, any lawyer in Indiana who 
relies on this ethics opinion would be going out on a limb if the lawyer does not report 
suspected child abuse or neglect”).  Indiana Department of Child Services spokesperson 
James Wide has been quoted as saying that the Committee’s Opinion “puts the safety of 
children at risk.”  Indiana Lawyers Say They’re Not Bound to Report Child Abuse, J. 
GAZETTE (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/indiana/Indiana-
lawyers-say-they-re-not-bound-to-report-child-abuse-9316910.   
 57  See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND 
THERE (N.Y. MacMillan & Co. 1875). 
 58  For a good discussion of that question, see Mosteller, supra note 14, at 271 nn. 
204–05. 
 59  For an argument in favor of the position that lawyers should not be required to 
disclose confidential information under the mandatory reporting statute see Smith, supra 
note 52, at 453, 455–57, 458–69 (mandatory reporting undermines the attorney-client 
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application of the Statute to lawyers weakens the duty of confidentiality 
and the principles upon which it is based.  It diminishes the value of the 
trust clients have on their lawyers, and affects the attorney-client 
relationship by essentially “deputizing” lawyers to monitor their own 
clients or to become informants against them.  Thus, because protecting the 
confidentiality of the information and the attorney-client relationship serves 
important legal and social goals, lawyers should not be obligated to 
disclose confidential information.60   
Unfortunately, however, the Committee’s position is not supported by 
the text of the Statute or the Rules.61  For that reason, those who prefer the 
Committee’s view on this issue should work to amend the Statute to reflect 
a different public policy.  Indiana could, for example, adopt the approach 
taken in Illinois, where the mandatory reporting statute holds that the 
reporting requirements do not apply to the contents of a privileged 
communication between attorneys and their clients or to confidential 
information within the meaning of the Illinois Rules of Professional 
Conduct.62  The new statute should also explicitly recognize that the 
attorney-client privilege will be available in proceedings in which the Rules 
of Evidence apply.  Such an approach would better define the proper 
 
privilege, can violate a client’s rights under the Sixth Amendment, and can create a conflict 
of interest between the client’s interests and defense counsel’s own interest in complying 
with the law). 
 60  See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 230–31 (“Even if the state is ultimately prohibited 
from calling the lawyer as a witness at the client’s trial, the major damage would have been 
done, and the promise of secrecy . . . would prove ineffective in facilitating open and free 
confiding of sensitive information.” (footnote omitted)). 
 61  In fact, it can be argued that the proper interpretation of the statute and the rules 
leads to the opposite conclusion.  See Smith, supra note 52, at 452 (“Because the 
communications provided for in the duty of confidentiality encompass the communications 
of the attorney-client privilege, one could argue that, by excepting the duty of 
confidentiality, Indiana automatically carved out an exception to the attorney-client 
privilege.”). 
 62  See 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2014) (“The reporting requirements of this Act shall 
not apply to the contents of a privileged communication between an attorney and his or her 
client or to confidential information within the meaning of Rule 1.6 of the Illinois Rules of 
Professional Conduct relating to the legal representation of an individual client.”); see also 
ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2016).  It is important to note how the Illinois statute 
covers both information protected by the attorney-client privilege and confidential 
information under the rules of professional conduct.  If the statute only protected privileged 
information, the attorney would still be required to disclose confidential information in 
some cases.  The privilege only covers information provided by the client to the attorney in 
confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal representation.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  If the attorney obtains the 
information about the child abuse from a third party, or from the client but in the presence of 
a third party, the information is confidential but not covered by the privilege.  In such a case, 
if the statute only covered privileged information, the attorney would have to disclose the 
information. 
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relationship between the Statute, the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Although this approach does eliminate the 
availability of one possible source of information in the efforts to identify 
victims of abuse, it also preserves an important, indeed indispensable, 
component of our system of justice. 
Meanwhile, lawyers should follow a relatively simple four-step 
analysis to determine if they can, or must, disclose information obtained 
during the course of the representation of a client.  First, the lawyer should 
determine if the information falls within the definition of confidential 
information according to the Rules of Professional Conduct.63  If it does 
not, the duty of confidentiality does not apply and the attorney can decide 
what to do with, or about, the information.  On the other hand, if the 
information is confidential, the second step is to determine if there is a duty 
to disclose it, whether a statute, court order, or rule of professional conduct 
imposes that duty.  If there is a duty to disclose, the attorney must disclose 
according to that duty.  If there is no duty to disclose, the third step is to 
determine if there is an exception that allows the attorney to disclose the 
information at his or her discretion.  If not, then the duty is to keep the 
information secret.64  If there is an exception, then the final step is for the 
attorney to use his or her discretion and determine whether to disclose 
based on a careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages and 
possible consequences of disclosure. 
Using this relatively straightforward flow-chart-like analysis, lawyers 
can always determine how to best apply the duty of confidentiality.  
Applied to the question asked by the Ethics Committee in Opinion No. 2 of 
2015, the answer should be that, under the current state of the law, lawyers 
must abide by the duty imposed by the Statute and, therefore, must disclose 
any information that gives them reason to believe that a child is a victim of 
abuse or neglect.  This is not the ideal result and the law should be 




 63  Section 59 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides the 
most commonly used definition.  It states that “[c]onfidential client information consists of 
information relating to representation of a client, other than information that is generally 
known.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 64  If an attorney feels strongly enough that certain information should be disclosed 
even though there is a duty to keep the information secret, the attorney can always disclose 
the information understanding he or she will have to face the consequences of having 
violated an ethical duty. 
